Real Property - Recording Acts - Recordation of Unacknowledged Instruments by Yri, K. R
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 32 Number 1 Article 3 
1956 
Real Property - Recording Acts - Recordation of Unacknowledged 
Instruments 
K. R. Yri 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Yri, K. R. (1956) "Real Property - Recording Acts - Recordation of Unacknowledged Instruments," North 
Dakota Law Review: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol32/iss1/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
NOTES
REAL PROPERTY - RECORDING ACTS - RECORDATION OF UN-
ACKNOWLEDGED INSTRUMENTS - In Messersmith v. Smith,' a recent
North Dakota case, A executed a quit claim deed to B in May,
1946 which was not recorded until July, 1951. A executed a
mineral deed to the same property to C who did not record. This
deed, although containing a certificate of acknowledgment, did
not comply with North Dakota statutes2 because the acknow-
ledgment was taken over the telephone rather than personally.
C later conveyed to D and in May, 1951, C's deed and D's deed
were recorded. In an action to quiet title the court held for B.
Because C's deed had not been properly acknowledged it was
not entitled to be recorded. Therefore, its actual record was not
notice to D of its execution, and D was not a bona fide pur-
chaser without notice.3 The effect of this is to say that D must
view the record as if the conveyance from A to C was not present.
Jurisdictions in this country that have statutes similar to those
of North Dakota consistently hold that the recordation of an
unacknowledged instrument does not give constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers.4 The impact of such holdings on the
recording acts of this country is far reaching and leads to the
discussion of: (1) the effect and purpose of recording acts, (2)
the effect of acknowledgments upon the recording acts, and
(3) the results of curative legislation.
The Effect and Purpose of the Recording Acts
The recording of land transactions dates back to biblical
times when Abraham purchased the field of Ephraim.' However,
these ancient deed recordings were not public and only showed
the title as between the parties involved.0 The purpose of the
first American recording act, which was adopted in Massachu-
1. 60 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1953).
2. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-1903 (1943) (Before an instrument can be recorded. ...
its execution must be established: 1. If executed by an individual, by acknowledgment
by the person executing the same . . . . ); N.D. Rev. Code § 47-1927 (1943) (Indicates
the proper form of the certificate of acknowledgment and it states that the grantor was
personally before the notary.).
3. See note I: supra at 281. (Court inferred that if A would have had title at the
time of the conveyance to C and if the action had been between A and D the outcome
would have been different.).
4. McDonald v. Norton, 123 Ark. 473, 185 S.W. 791 (1916); Harris v. Reed, 21
Idaho 364, 121 Pac. 780 (1912); Baum v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 55 Mont. 219, 175
Pac. 872 (1918); Pease v. Magill, 17 N.D. 166, 115 N.W. 260 (1908); Kees v. Beardsley,
190 Cal. 466, 213 Pac. 500, 502 (1923) (dictum).
5. 28 Geo.L.J. 307 (1939).
-6. Ibid.
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setts, was to make it possible for every man to ". . .know what
estate or interest other men may have in any houses, lands or
other hereditaments . . . that they deale in .... .- Recording
acts, now common in every state, are of four types:8 (1) race-
notice, (2) notice, (3) race, and (4) period of grace. In states
that have adopted the race-notice type statute the purchaser
is protected only if he records firstY If the notice statute is
employed, emphasis is not on the race to the recorder's office
and a subsequent bona fide purchaser is protected whether he
records first or not.10 Under a race statute the premium is
placed on recording first regardless of the fact that the pur-
chaser has notice of an outstanding claim.11 In the few jurisdictions
that utilize the period of grace statute the grantee has a certain
period in which to record, and a subsequent purchaser is pro-
tected only if the prior grantee fails to record the instrument in
the period granted by the statute.1 2
With the exception of those states having "race" type statutes,
the law concerns itself only with the protection of bona fide
purchasers and those persons who acquire real property through
such purchasers. 13 It appears that to achieve the status of a
bona fide purchaser three elements must be shown: (1) the
payment of a valuable consideration, (2) good faith, and (3)
absence of notice of outstanding rights of others.14
Consideration-It is generally conceded that the payment of
a purely nominal consideration,' 5 such as one dollar"e or love
and affection," will not constitute one a bona fide purchaser for
7. Bayse, Clearing Land Titles 532 (1953).
8. Casner and Leach, Cases and Text on Property 783 (1950).
9. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 1214 (West 1953) (Every conveyance of real property, other
than a lease for a term not exceeding one year is void as against any subsequent purchaser
or mortgagee of the same property or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable
consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded and as against any judgment affecting
the title less such conveyance shall have been duly recorded prior to the record of notice
of action.); Idaho Code § 55-812 (1947); Mich. Comp. Laws § 565.29 (1948); Mont.
Rev. Code § 6935 (1935); N.D. Rev. Code § 47-1941 (1943); S.D. Code § 51.1620
(1939); Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 (1953).
10. Ariz. Code Ann. § 71-414 (1939); Fla. Stat. § 695.01 (1953); Iowa Code
558.41 (1946) (No instrument affecting real estate is of any validity against a subse-
quent purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice unless Sled in the office
of the recorder of the county in which same lies.); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 382.270 (1953);
Tenn. Code § 7596 (1932); W.Va. Code Ann. § 3993 (1955).
11. Casner and Leach, Cases and Text on Property 783 (1950).
12. Del. Rev. Code § 3680 (1935) (Required to record within three months after
sealing and delivery of the deed before protection is given against a subsequent urchaser
for value.)
13. Burby, Real Property 490 (1954).
14. United States v. California and Orgon Land Company, 148 U.S. 31, 42 (1893)
(dictum).
15. Morris v. Wicks, 81 Kan. 790, 106 Pac. 1048, Id. at 1049 (1910 (dictum).
17. Alexander v. O'Neil, 77 Ariz. 91, 267 P.2d 730 (1954).
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value. However, in the case of Strong v. Whybark,8 love and
affection plus five dollars was considered a sufficiently valuable
consideration to entitle the grantee to the rights of a bona fide
purchaser for value. The views are conflicting as to whether a
pre-existing debt is sufficient consideration. Some jurisdictions
hold that as the purchaser parts with nothing at the time of
the purchase he is, in a technical sense, not a purchaser for value,
and hence, not entitled to protection under the recording acts.' 9
Under a compromise rule, used in at least one jurisdiction, if
the purchaser can show that subsequent to the purchase his rights
as a creditor have been adversely prejudiced he is a purchaser
for value. 0
Good Faith-This element, although difficult of definition, is
present when the purchaser has an honest intent" and purpose,22
and a mere error in judgment alone will not impeach this good
faith.2 3
Notice-Generally speaking, notice may be either actual or
constructive.2 4 If a purchaser has knowledge which in the exer-
cise of common reason would put a man on inquiry, it will be
presumed that such inquiry has been made and notice of what
the inquiry would have revealed will be charged.2 5 Notice need
not be given to every member involved in a transaction before
all members are deemed to have had notice. Notice to one of two
parties to a joint transaction is notice to both parties.26 Similarly,
a purchaser is deemed to have received notice if notice was
given to his agent.27 However, a mere want of caution, or a
small suspicion or rumor29 of an interest in another will not
constitute notice.
Generally it appears that a purchaser is chared with notice of
anything that appears in his grantor's chain of title.1° That is, he is
charged with notice of all matters referred to in any convey-
18. 204 Mo. 341, 102 S.W. 968 (1907).
19. E.g., Swan v. Rotan State Bank, 115 Tex. 425, 282 S.W. 789 (1926); Ellis v.
Nickle, 193 Ark. 657, 101 S.W.2d 958 (1937); Dietsch v. Long, 72 Ohio App. 349,
43 N.E.2d 906 (1942).
20. Luschen v. Stanton, 192 Okla. 454, 137 P.2d 567 (1943).
21. Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47, 103 Pac. 1016, 1019 (1909) (dictum).
22. Miller v. Tidal Oil Co., 161 Okla. 155, 17 P.2d 967 (1933) (dictum).
23. Ibid.
24. Willard v. Bringolf, 102 Ind. App. 16, 5 N.E.2d 315, 321 (1936) (dictum).
25. Fluegel v. Henschel, 7 N.D. 276, 74 N.W. 996 (1898); Anthony v. Wheeler,
130 Ill. 128, 22 N.E. 494, 495 (1889) (dictum).
26. Northern Ill. Coal Corp. v. Cryder. 361 I11. 214, 197 N.E. 750, 756 (1935) (dictum).
27. Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 276 (1896) (dictum).
28. Anthoney v. Wheeler, supra note 25.
29. See note 27 supra.
30. Ochoa v. Hernandez Y. Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913); Williams v. Harris County
Ship Channel Nay. Dist., 128 Tex. 411, 99 S.W.2d 276 (1936).
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ance which is necessary to support his title, and it immaterial
that there is no actual notice of the conveyance."1 This could
include instruments referred to in the instruments on record
regardless of whether the former instruments have been recorded .
2
On text writer33 states, "The interpretation of the American
rceording statutes, according to a majority of the decisions, is
to the effect that recording statutes afford a means of main-
taining priority and that recordation is constructive notice of
the interest the interests created by the recorded instrument."
Thus, if a person is a good faith purchaser for value without
notice of an outstanding claim, protection should be afforded
under the recording acts.
The Effect of Acknowledgments on the Acts
The act of acknowledgment 4 appears to have come into exis-
tence in England during the seventeenth century.35 Its purpose
was probably to satisfy the enrolling officer not only that the
instrument involved had been duly executed but also to prevent
impersonation.3 6  The requirement that an instrument be duly
acknowledged is purely statutory,3 7 and while in some states
acknowledgment is needed in order to make the conveyance
effective between the parties,38 it is usually merely a prerequisite
to recording the conveyance. 9 Litigation arises not only where
an unacknowledged deed is recorded 40 but also where a defec-
tive certificate of acknowledgment is placed on record.41 These
31. Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484, 137 Pac. 260 (1913) (Case involved a reserva-
tion of a right away. P's deed contained no reservation of the right away but the court
held that P had notice of it because the reservation was in an instrument in P's chain of
title.); Baldwin v. Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 60 So. 578 (1913) (Deed to purchaser's
grantor indicated inadequate consideration. This was held sufficient to constitute notice.);
Lyon v. Gambert, 63 Neb. 630, 88 N.W. 774 (1902).
32. Weigel v. Green, 218 I11. 227, 75 N.E. 913 (1905); Duval v. Crawford, 73 W.Va.
122, 80 S.E. 833 (1914).
33. Burby, Real Property 488 (1954).
34. Jemison v. Howell, 230 Ala. 423, 161 So. 806, 808 (1935) (dictum) (Acknow-
ledgment is the formal admission, before an officer, by the person ,who executed the in-
strument that such was his act.); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Carlson, 114 Conn. 514,
159 Atl. 352, 354 (1932) (dictum).
35. 4 American Law of Property § 17.31 (Casner ed. 1952).
36. Ibid.
37. Munsey Trust Co. v. Alexander, 42 F.2d 604, 605 (5th Cir. 1930) (dictum).
38. Lewis v. Herrera, 10 Ariz. 74, 85 Pac. 245 (1906); Parrott v. Kumpf, 102 Ill.
423 (1882).
39. Harris v. Reed, 21 Idaho 364, 121 Pac. 780 (1912); Kitchen v. Canavon, 36
N.M. 273, 13 P.2d 877 (1932) (dictum); Lee v. Murphy, 119 Cal. 364, 51 Pac. 549,
551 (1897) (dictum).
40. See note 4 supra.
41. See Kielig v. Hoyt, 31 Neb. 453, 48 N.W. 66 (1891) (Acknowledgment did not
indicate that mortgagor executed the instrument voluntarily.); Childers v. Wm. H. Coleman
Co., 122 Tenn. 109, 118 S.W. 1018 (]909) (Acknowledgment failed to contain the words
"for the purposes therein contained."): South. Penn. Oil Co. v. Blue Creek Development
Co. 77 W. Va. 682, 88 S.E. 1029 (1816) (Acknowledgment was not signed by notary,
therefore the recorded instrument was held not to be constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser.)
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infirmities in the numerous instruments that are entered in
public records are definitely jeopardizing our recording system.' 2
It is the generally accepted rule that the recordation of a deed
containing patent defects in the certificate of acknowledgment
does not constitute constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide
purchaser.4' Defective certificates of this type include those where
the certificate of acknowledgment does not contain the signature
of the notary," comply with the exact words of the statute,"
indicate that the acknowledgment was voluntary,' or that the
officer was sworn.1 7
There are cases however where statutes have been violated
because of existence of latent rather than patent defects, as
where the acknowledging officer was interested in the conveyance "
or where the officer acknowledged an instrument outside his
jurisdiction.49 It is obvious that defects of this type are not
apparent on the face of the instrument, and the prevailing
rule is that the recordation of instruments containing (latent)
defects in the certificate of acknowledgment constitutes constructive
notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser." With respect to
this latter rule the Wyoming court in Boswell v. First Nat'l Bank
of Laramie stated:5
"This rule is sustained by abundant authority and is founded
on public policy to carry out the purpose of the recording acts
and preserve the reliability of the public records of transfers
and conveyances. It is readily seen that a contrary rule would
render unsafe any reliance upon the record of deeds or instru-
ments requiring acknowledgment to entitle them to be re-
corded."
It would seem plausible to apply this reasoning to a case
where the deed was unacknowledged although containing a
42. Bayse, Clearing Land Titles 378 (1953).
43. Greenwood v. Jenswold, 69 Iowa 53, 28 N.W. 433 (1886); Cannon v. Deming,
3 S.D. 421, 53 N.W. 863 (1892); Abney v. Ohio Lumber & Mining Co., 45 W.Va. 446,
32 S.E. 256 (1898); Patton, Titles 685 (1938).
44. South Penn Oil Co., v. Blue Creek Development Co., 77 W.Va. 682, 88 S.E. 1029
(1916).
45. Childers v. Win. H. Coleman Co., 122 Tenn. 109, 118 S.W. 1018 (1909) (Ack-
nowledgment failed to contain the words "for the purposes therein contained.").
46. Keeling v. Hoyt, 31 Neb. 453. 48 N.W. 66 (1891).
47. Abney v. Ohio Lumber & Mining Co., 45 W.Va. 446, 32 S.E. 256 (1898).
48. Hario v. Collins, 146 Okla. 131, 293 Pac. 179 (1930) (The interest howveer cannot
be apparent on the face of the instrument.).
49. See Peterson v. Lowry, 48 Tex. 408 (1874).
50. Peterson v. Lowry, supra note 49. (Court stated, "... Nor are we prepared to hold
that a certificate regular upon its face upon which an instrumnet was recorded, could be
set saide as a nullity by extraneous facts so as to prevent the record of the instrument from
being notice to subsequent purchaser .... "); Harjo v. Collins, supra note 48; Lankford
v. First Nat'l Bank of Lawton, 5 Okla. 159, 183 Pac. 56 (1919) (Court held that
acknowledgment by an interested party was a latent defect.).
51. 16 Wyo. 161, 92 Pac. 624, 628 (1907).
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complete certificate of acknowledgment. However, there is an
obvious distinction between the two situations. In the former
situation there was an acknowledgment and the defect was in the
certificate itself, while in the latter the instument was not in fact
acknowledged. In this latter situation the latent defect was that
the officer was not authorized to sign the certificate because the
grantor had not in fact appeared before the officer for the pur--
pose of acknowledgment. In other words the latent defect went
straight to the essence of the act of acknowledgment while in
the former situation that was not true. To apply the rule set forth
in Boswell v. First Nat'l Bank of Laramie to this later situation
would probably foster impersonation while under the former
damage would be improbable.
In Titus v. Johnson it was stated:i2
"When an instrument with the certificate of acknowledgment
or proof of execution as required by law is presented to the
recorder it is made his imperative duty to record it."
Although supporting authority is lacking it would seem that
if the recorder is obliged to record a perfectly valid appearing
deed, constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser would logically
follow.
In Dixon v. Kaufman, 53 a deed was recorded without being
acknowledged. The instrument however, did contain a valid
appearing certificate of acknowledgment. In an action between
the grantor, who had title when the deed was conveyed, and the
subsequent purchaser from the grantor's grantee, the court granted
relief to the bona fide purchaser on the ground that the grantor
should not be granted relief from consequences of his own act
which would result in a loss to an innocent purchaser. This same
reasoning should be applicable where a previous grantee of the
grantor fails to record his instrument and a subsequent bona fide
purchaser of the grantor sustains a loss. The previous grantee,
having "slept on his rights", should be estopped to enforce his
interest. 4 It is this failure to record that misleads innocent pur-
chaser.
In the absence of fraud or duress certificates of acknowledgment
52. 50 Tex. 224, 240 (1878).
53. 58 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1953).
54. Marling v. Milwaukee Realty Co., 127 Wis. 363, 106 N.W. 844 (1906) (Plaintiff
in this case was estopped to enforce a mortgage because of his failure to record it. Court
stated that plaintiff was bound to know that the parties dealing with the title to the
land would rely on the records.).
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have been held conclusive of the facts stated." Security of title
is obviously the reason for such a rule.56 However, this rule not
been extended to cases where the grantor has never appeared
before the officer for the purpose of acknowledgment- r except by
a minority58 of the jurisdictions which apply this principle to in-
stances where the acknowledgment is given over the telephone.5 9
Results of Curative Legislation
The accumulation of defective acknowdgments and their effect
on marketability of land has caused such a deplorable condition
that many states have found it necessary to pass curative legis-
lation in order to give much needed relief to land owners."
Although it has been argued that curative statutes exercise judicial
powers 1 and take property without due process of law,62 courts
treat these curative statutes as valid. 3 States have passed such
legislation to validate instruments defective because of acknowledg-
ments taken by an unauthorized person, 64 acknowledgments by
officers outside their jurisdiction,5 acknowledgments by interested
parties,"6 and acknowledgments of married women not taken
separately.67 There are states that have validated acknowledg-
ments defective for any reason.68 Often the legislation only pertains
to instruments recorded for a designated number of years 5 or
55. White v. Union Producing Co., 140 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1944); Jemison v. Holwell,
230 Ala. 423, 161 So. 806 (1935).
56. City Bank and Trust Co. v. Planters Bank and Trust Co., 176 Ky. 500, 195 S.W.
1124, 1125 (1917) (dictum).
57. See Bauder v. Bauder, 195 Okla. 85, 155 P.2d 543 (1945); Potter v. Steer,
95 N.J. Eq. 102, 122 Atl. 685 (1923).
58. 26 Mich.L.Rev. 564 (1928).
59. Abernathy v. Harris, 185 Ark. 22, 34 S.W.2d 765 (1931); Logan Gas Co., v.
Keith, 117 Ohio St. 206, 158 N.E. 184 (1927). Contra, Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla.
157, 84 So. 151 (19 20).
60. Bayse, Clearing Land Titles 359 (1953).
61. See Chestnut v. Shane, 16 Ohio 599 (1947).
62. See Eckles v. Wood, 143 Ky. 451, 136 S.W. 907 (1911).
63. Bowne v. Ide, 109 Conn. 307, 147 Atl. 4, 6 (1929) (dictum).
64. Ark. Stat., § 49-213 (e) (1947); Del. Rev. Code § 3675 (18) (1935); N.D. Rev.
Code § 1-0403 (1943) ("The acts of every notary public, justice of the peace or other
officer done in good faith in taking or certifying to the acknowledgment of any instrument
mentioned in § 1-0401 whether within or without the state, and whether such officer was
qualified by law at the time to do so or not, hereby are declared legal and valid for all
purposes".).
65. Me. Rev. Stat. c. 154 § 40 (1944).
66. Iowa Code § 534.86 (1916); N.D. Rev. Code § 47-1934 (1943).
67. Del. Rev. Code § 3665 (1935); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 93.810 (5) (1953).
68. Del. Rev. Code § 3675 (1935); Fla. Stat. § 95.26 (1953); N.D. Rev. Code § 1-0401
(1943) (Makes valid instruments recorded prior to January 1, 1943 regardless if the
acknowl-dgment was d-f-ctive.).
69. Williams v. Butterfield, 77 S.W. 729 (Mo. 1896) (Requires recording for one year
before a d-fective acknowledgment is deemed valid.); Bledsoe v. Haney, 139 S.W. 612,
(Tex. 1911) (If defectively record-d deed has been recorded for ten years it will be
given the same effect as if it were not defective at all.).
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to those instruments recorded prior to a certain date.70 A study
of these statutes makes it obvious that they are not the answer
to the problem because there will always be a certain lapse
of time during which the recordation of an instrument bearing a
defective acknowledgment will not constitute constructive notice
to subsequent bona fide purchasers.
Conclusion
Possibly it can be stated that acknowledgments have outgrown
their purpose and that their only accomplishment is to add for-
malism and ritualism to our conveying instruments.7- The present
unstable position of our recording acts because of the acknow-
ledgment requirement can not be entirely cured by the courts.
The requirement of an acknowledgment as a prerequisite to re-
cording is statutory,7 ' therefore any remedial measures are the
responsibility of the legislature. Until such time as adequate
remedies !are instituted the marketability of titles in North
Dakota will remain questionable.
K. R. YRI
70. N.D. Rev. Code § 1-0401 (1943) (Pertains to instruments recorded prior to January
1, 1943.).
71. Bayse, Clearing Land Titles 358 (1953).
72. See note 39 supra.
